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Most behavioral decision research takes place in carefully controlled laboratory settings,
and examination of relationships between performance and specific real-world decision
outcomes is rare. One prior study shows that people who perform better on hypothetical
decision tasks, assessed using the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC)
measure, also tend to experience better real-world decision outcomes, as reported on
the Decision Outcomes Inventory (DOI). The DOI score reflects avoidance of outcomes
that could result from poor decisions, ranging from serious (e.g., bankruptcy) to minor
(e.g., blisters from sunburn). The present analyses go beyond the initial work, which
focused on the overall DOI score, by analyzing the relationships between specific
decision outcomes and A-DMC performance. Most outcomes are significantly more likely
among people with lower A-DMC scores, even after taking into account two variables
expected to produce worse real-world decision outcomes: younger age and lower
socio-economic status. We discuss the usefulness of DOI as a measure of successful
real-world decision-making.
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Introduction
Throughout their lives, people face decisions that affect their finances, health, and overall quality
of life. Behavioral decision research aims to understand how people make decisions, with the ulti-
mate goal of improving experienced decision outcomes. However, examination of these real-world
decision outcomes is rare. As an experimental science, behavioral decision research uses laboratory
settings deliberately isolated from everyday decisions. The hope is that tasks designed to capture
fundamental properties of those decisions will predict real-world decision performance and out-
comes. In Parker and Fischhoff (2005), we examined whether adolescents who did better on com-
monly used laboratory decision tasks also did better on presumptive precursors and consequences
of good decision-making.We found good construct validity, a pattern that has borne up in a unique
longitudinal data collection effort that followed the sample for 11 years (Parker et al., 2014). Other
research has also linked performance on decision-making competence tasks to various cognitive
abilities (e.g., Stanovich and West, 2000, 2008; Peters et al., 2006; Finucane and Gullion, 2010
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Del Missier et al., 2012, 2013), need for cognition and other
cognitive styles (e.g., Carnevale et al., 2011; Smith and Levin,
1996), less regret (Parker et al., 2007), and fewer suspensions
among students (Stanovich et al., 2003). Moreover, decision-
making competence has been improved as a result of targeted
decision education among high-school students (Jacobson et al.,
2012).
In Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), we adopted complemen-
tary strategies for assessing decision-making competence and
outcomes with adults. We first developed a composite measure
of Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC), using a set
of hypothetical decision tasks drawn from behavioral decision
research. We then validated performance on A-DMC against a
composite score of decision outcomes as self-reported on the
Decision Outcomes Inventory (DOI), which can be accessed
through the online Decision-Making Individual Differences
Inventory1.
The DOI elicits self-reports of outcomes that could result from
poorly made decisions. They range from serious (e.g., declared
bankruptcy) to minor (e.g., got blisters from sunburn). The DOI
was patterned after “life events” scales, which assess individuals’
overall life stress through their self-reports of life events found
to have adverse consequences (Masten et al., 1994; Brady and
Matthews, 2002). We used a 10-year time frame to allow time for
severe, and relatively uncommon, events to happen. Most items
were preceded by screening questions (have you ever had a credit
card?), establishing the possibility of experiencing a bad outcome
if a poor decision were made (have you ever had $5000 in credit
card debt?). The overall DOI score reflects avoiding more neg-
ative decision outcomes, such that higher scores reflect better
performance. In Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), we found that
people who did better on hypothetical decision tasks (as seen in
high A-DMC scores) also experienced better real-world decision
outcomes (as captured by the DOI score).
The approach to DOI scoring in Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007)
assumed that, across time, people, and decisions, good deci-
sion processes would predict good decision outcomes on aver-
age. That said, even the soundest decision-making processes
cannot guarantee good outcomes. In uncertain situations, some
unhappy surprises are inevitable even to good decision mak-
ers. Moreover, disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds may
increase exposure to negative life events (Brady and Matthews,
2002). We found a significant relationship between decision-
making competence (as measured on A-DMC) and better deci-
sion outcomes (as reported on the DOI), even after controlling
for socio-economic status (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
Because the DOI was designed to capture a range of deci-
sion outcomes varying in severity, the question arises how much
each contributed to the relationship between A-DMC and DOI.
There are several reasons to suspect that some of the negative
outcomes listed on the DOI might not be correlated to decision-
making competence (or A-DMC). Specifically, it is possible that
some negative outcomes actually reflect the best decision that
can be made in a bad situation. Some outcomes are bad in one
respect, but good in another. Moreover, some outcomes may not
1http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Decision_Outcome_Inventory.html
reflect one’s own decision making. For example, getting divorced
may be the best outcome for a bad marriage, be instigated by
one’s spouse, and involve a mix of positive experiences (i.e., start-
ing anew) and negative ones (i.e., regret about having chosen
a spouse poorly). Answering these concerns bears both on the
interpretation of the DOI—is it capturing a unified construct
of poor decision outcomes—and on future development of the
DOI—item-level analysis could help inform future refinement or
reduction in length.
Here, we go beyond our previous analyses and examine
the relationships between A-DMC scores and the individual
outcomes listed on the DOI. We also control for age and
socio-economic status (SES), both potentially correlated with
individuals’ exposure to the possibility of negative events and
ability to keep them from happening. Younger individuals may
make more poor decisions because they have had less opportu-
nity to acquire experience and may have greater struggles with
impulsivity and social pressures (Reyna and Farley, 2006). Lower
SES could force individuals to confront harder decisions, hence
creating more opportunities for negative outcomes, and to have
fewer resources for mitigating their effects (Brady and Matthews,
2002). In Parker and Fischhoff (2005), we found evidence sug-
gesting that young people growing up in lower SES environments
may have less opportunity to observe sound decision making
and receive less consistent positive reinforcement for their own
attempts to master those skills.
Methods
We re-analyzed data collected from 360 participants, recruited
from the Pittsburgh community through social-service and other
community organizations (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). This
strategy created a sample that varied widely in socio-economic
status (which we assessed with the proxy measure of the social-
service organizations through which we recruited participants).
Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 88, 74% were women,
66% self-identified as White, 28% as African American, and
6% as other. Forty percent reported having at least a bachelor’s
degree.
In group-administered sessions, participants completed both
the DOI and the A-DMC battery. The DOI asked them to self-
report on the 41 negative decision outcomes in Table 1. Thirty-
five of these outcomes were preceded by filter questions asking
if participants had been in a position to experience the outcome.
For example, the question on whether the participant had missed
a flight (the outcome) was preceded by a question asking whether
they had taken a plane trip (the filter). Overall DOI scores were
computed as the percentage of negative outcomes experienced,
among those that could have happened2.
A-DMC has six hypothetical decision tasks: Resistance to
Framing, Recognizing Social Norms, Under/overconfidence,
2Here, we focus on the unweighted percentage, which is highly correlated with the
weighted percentage (r = 0.92, p < 0.001) also reported by Bruine de Bruin et al.
(2007), with which outcomes are weighted by the reciprocal of their frequency—
assuming that rarer outcomes are worse. Hence, here overall DOI can be thought of
as a simple summary of the 41 individual outcomes, rather than one emphasizing
uncommon (and more severe) outcomes.
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TABLE 1 | Outcomes captured by the Decision-Outcomes Inventory for low and high A-DMC subsamples (among those for whom each was possible).
DOI outcome Prevalence of DOI outcome
% in Low A-DMC % in High A-DMC Difference
Had more than $5000 in credit card debt 30.1 43.6 −13.5*
Gotten lost or gone the wrong way for more than 10min while driving 60.5 70.6 −10.1*
Returned a movie you rented without having watched it at all 72.1 77.2 −5.1
Had a check bounce 37.0 41.0 −4.0
Threw out food or groceries you had bought, because they went bad 88.1 91.3 −3.2
Lost more than $1000 on a stock-market investment 46.4 48.9 −2.5
Got blisters from sun burn 25.0 27.3 −2.3
Forgotten a birthday of someone close to you and did not realize until the next day or later. 56.8 57.9 −1.1
Taken the wrong train or bus 15.3 13.1 2.2
Loaned more than $50 to someone and never got it back 70.1 67.7 2.4
Bought new clothes or shoes you never wore 59.7 56.5 3.2
Locked your keys in the car 56.1 52.5 3.6
Been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes 9.5 4.7 4.8+
Consumed so much alcohol you vomited 41.2 35.8 5.4
Received a DUI for drunk driving 8.2 2.7 5.5+
Had your driver’s license taken away from you by the police 11.6 5.6 6.0+
Been accused of causing a car accident while driving 21.0 14.7 6.3
Declared bankruptcy 12.2 5.9 6.3*
Broke a bone because you fell, slipped, or misstepped 20.3 13.5 6.8+
Gotten more than 5 speeding tickets 8.1 1.2 6.9**
Locked yourself out of your home 48.3 41.0 7.3
Missed a flight 14.7 7.3 7.4+
Been in a public fight or screaming argument 24.0 16.5 7.5+
Gotten more than 5 parking tickets 13.0 4.9 8.1*
Ruined your clothes because you didn’t follow the laundry instructions on the label 55.1 46.0 9.1+
Been diagnosed with an STD (Sexually Transmitted Disease) 13.1 3.4 9.7**
Foreclosed a mortgage or loan 12.9 2.9 10.0**
Been in a jail cell overnight for any reason 13.1 2.9 10.2***
Paid a rent or mortgage payment at least 2 weeks too late 31.6 19.4 12.2*
Been kicked out of a bar, restaurant, or hotel by someone who works there 15.7 3.0 12.7***
Had a condom break, tear, or slip off 39.1 25.7 13.4+
Had an unplanned pregnancy (or got someone pregnant, unplanned) 24.5 9.9 14.6**
Had to spend at least $500 to fix a car you had owned for less than half a year 41.6 26.8 14.8*
Been suspended from school for at least 1 day for any reason 24.4 7.9 16.5**
Been divorced 26.2 9.3 16.9**
Had your ID replaced because you lost it 32.6 15.6 17.0***
Been kicked out of an apartment or rental property before the lease ran out 23.6 3.4 20.2***
Quit a job after a week 23.2 2.6 20.6***
Had the key to your home replaced because you lost it 35.0 13.2 21.8***
Had your electricity, cable, gas or water shut off because you didn’t pay on time 27.9 4.6 23.3***
Cheated on your romantic partner of 1 year by having sex with someone else 34.9 7.2 27.7***
Mean percentage of outcomes 32.3% 24.8% 7.5%***
Difference in prevalence tested using chi-square test of independence for individual outcomes and using two-sample t-test for mean percentage; +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01;
***p < 0.001. The final six items had no conditioning event.
Applying Decision Rules, Consistency in Risk Perception, and
Resistance to Sunk Costs (the full instrument can be found at
the online Decision-Making Individual Differences Inventory3).
3 http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Adult_-_Decision_Making_Competence.html
Responses are scored in terms of either consistency with one
another or correspondence to an external criterion. Here we use
a summary A-DMC score, equal to an unweighted mean of the
standardized task scores, standardized to have zero mean and
standard deviation of one. We use a median split in Table 1 as
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an easy way to present the differences in performance among
individuals with higher and lower scores.
This research was approved by the Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity Institutional Review Board, and all data collection conformed
to U.S. human subjects regulatory standards. Informed consent
was obtained from all subjects.
Analysis Plan
We first summarize the rate of experiencing each DOI outcome
for those with relatively low and high A-DMC (Table 1). We
then (in Table 2) use bivariate and multivariate logistic regres-
sion to predict each DOI outcome and the overall DOI score with
A-DMC (using the full range), age, and SES4 .
This paper is accompanied by supplementary material that
provides additional detail on the relationships between individual
DOI outcomes and individual A-DMC subscales. The pattern of
results broadly support the relationships reported below, as well
as correlations of overall DOI with DMC subscales (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007).
Results
How is A-DMC Related to Individual DOI
Outcomes?
Table 1 shows the frequency of each negative DOI outcome, for
participants with lower and higher DMC scores (among those
for whom that outcome was possible), ordered by the differ-
ence in percentages. The first eight items are ones for which
low A-DMC appears protective, in the sense of being reported
less often by low A-DMC participants. The two statistically sig-
nificant differences (p < 0.05) show that low-A-DMC partici-
pants are less likely to have more than $5000 credit card debt
and to have gotten lost while driving. The other 33 outcomes
are less likely for participants with high A-DMC, significantly
so in most cases. On average, the outcomes are 7.5% less likely
for high A-DMC participants. Thus, if A-DMC is accepted as a
measure of decision-making ability, thenmost DOI outcomes are
indicators of poor decision making. Nonetheless, the exceptions
are puzzling and perhaps partially explained by the analyses that
follow.
Do DOI Outcomes Reflect Factors other than
Decision-Making Competence?
Table 2 considers the effects of two non-decision factors on DOI
outcomes: age and SES. The results are odds ratios from logis-
tic regression analyses, using the full range of the A-DMC scores
(rather than a binary variable), normalized so that each unit
increment represents one standard deviation. The bivariate odds
express the difference in the prevalence of the DOI outcome in
odds ratios terms, with ratios less than one meaning that the
4 We also considered gender, but chose to leave it out of the reported analyses, since
we did not have strong a priori expectations for a direction of effect. That said, the
results for gender were quite modest, especially considering the number of tests. In
total, six outcomes (suspended from school, lost driver’s license, kicked out of bar,
drank so much you vomited, DUI, and public fight) were more likely among men
(at p < 0.05) and only one outcome (bought new clothes or shoes you never wore)
was more likely among women.
(bad) outcome is more likely for participants with lower A-DMC
scores. As would be expected from Table 1, the first eight items
have odds ratios greater than one5. The next column shows the
odds ratio for the A-DMC scores, after controlling for age and
SES. The overall pattern is largely unchanged. Three quarters
of the odds ratios are less than one, and often significantly so.
Nonetheless, most are closer to one than in the previous col-
umn, indicating that these controls are related to the decision
outcomes.
The final two columns show odds ratios for age and SES, con-
trolling for each other and A-DMC. Age is scaled continuously,
with each unit equal to 10 years to show differences better6 . The
odds ratios for age are almost all less than one, indicating that
the DOI outcomes are more likely for younger respondents (as
mentioned, controlling for A-DMC and SES). For example, the
younger respondents are 14% (1/0.88 – 1) more likely to report
having bought and never worn clothing or shoes in the preced-
ing 10 years (the reporting period for these items) and almost
twice as likely to have been kicked out of a bar, restaurant, or
hotel (the smallest ratio). In the final column (Low SES), about
three-quarters of the odds ratios are greater than one, indicat-
ing that the outcome is more likely for lower-SES individuals.
For example, they are 66% more likely not to have worn shoes
or clothing that they bought (row 1) and almost 13 times more
likely to report having been diagnosed with an STD (the highest
ratio) (controlling for A-DMC and SES).
The final row of Table 2 presents standardized linear regres-
sion coefficients for predicting the overall percentage of negative
outcomes that participants reported experiencing (among those
possible for each individual) with A-DMC, age, and SES. The
results show the strongest effect for age, with both A-DMC and
SES showing significant marginal effects. However, controlling
for SES has a much stronger impact on the A-DMC coefficient
than does controlling for age, as A-DMC correlates strongly with
SES (r = −0.52, p < 0.001) but not with age (r = 0.04, ns).
Discussion
Here, we set out to address concerns about whether or not indi-
vidual items on the Decision Outcome Inventory (DOI) are
indicative of decision-making competence. We found that most
of the DOI outcomes are significantly more likely among par-
ticipants with lower A-DMC scores, suggesting that these out-
comes reflect, in part, poor decision-making competence. Many
of these outcomes are also related to two variables that would
be expected to produce worse outcomes: being young and being
poor. Indeed, most DOI outcomes are more common among
younger and lower SES participants. Young people have had less
opportunity to learn how to make decisions. Lower SES individ-
uals may face more perilous circumstances that expose them to
higher chances of negative outcomes (e.g., taking risks to avoid
crime or savemoney). Bothmay have fewer resources for limiting
damage (e.g., legal representation). Parker and Fischhoff (2005)
5The tests result in slightly different significance levels than in Table 1, largely due
to the use of the full range of the A-DMC variable, rather than a binarized version.
6The marginal effect of a single year in age is quite small, hence we divided age by
10 to provide odds ratios that are easier to interpret.
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TABLE 2 | Odds of outcomes on the Decision-Outcomes Inventory as a function of A-DMC, age, and SES.
DOI outcome Bivariate odds Multivariate odds (with control variables)
A-DMC A-DMC Age Low SES
Had more than $5000 in credit card debt 1.43* 1.49* 0.70*** 1.16
Gotten lost or gone the wrong way for more than 10min while driving 1.23 1.16 0.78** 0.80
Returned a movie you rented without having watched it at all 1.26 1.12 0.56*** 0.50*
Had a check bounce 1.02 1.28 0.64*** 2.95***
Threw out food or groceries you had bought, because they went bad 1.38+ 1.46 0.75** 1.18
Lost more than $1000 on a stock-market investment 1.12 1.04 1.05 0.69
Got blisters from sun burn 1.24 1.04 0.86+ 0.49*
Forgotten a birthday of someone close to you and did not realize until the next day or later 1.03 1.00 0.84* 0.83
Taken the wrong train or bus 0.94 1.05 0.70* 1.31
Loaned more than $50 to someone and never got it back 0.89 0.95 0.87 1.25
Bought new clothes or shoes you never wore 0.93 1.06 0.88+ 1.66+
Locked your keys in the car 1.03 0.91 1.12 0.60+
Been diagnosed with type 2 diabetes 0.61* 0.75 1.27+ 3.12+
Consumed so much alcohol you vomited 0.90 1.02 0.53*** 0.97
Received a DUI for drunk driving 0.45** 0.57 0.87 2.03
Had your driver’s license taken away from you by the police 0.48** 0.54* 0.67* 1.42
Been accused of causing a car accident while driving 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.74
Declared bankruptcy 0.55** 0.92 0.77* 8.43***
Broke a bone because you fell, slipped, or misstepped 0.87 0.73+ 0.91 0.46*
Gotten more than 5 speeding tickets 0.26*** 0.31** 0.93 2.11
Locked yourself out of your home 0.84 0.97 0.84* 1.75+
Missed a flight 0.68 0.75 0.76+ 1.45
Been in a public fight or screaming argument 0.73* 0.86 0.56*** 0.54
Gotten more than 5 parking tickets 0.54* 0.77 0.74* 3.75*
Ruined your clothes because you didn’t follow the laundry instructions on the label 0.89 0.84 0.78*** 0.78
Been diagnosed with an STD (Sexually Transmitted Disease) 0.45** 0.80 0.76 12.62**
Foreclosed a mortgage or loan 0.28*** 0.37** 0.96 6.87**
Been in a jail cell overnight for any reason 0.43*** 0.66+ 0.76* 5.07**
Paid a rent or mortgage payment at least 2 weeks too late 0.70* 0.99 0.76* 3.80***
Been kicked out of a bar, restaurant, or hotel by someone who works there 0.42*** 0.52* 0.53*** 1.69
Had a condom break, tear, or slip off 0.65* 0.69+ 0.88 1.18
Had an unplanned pregnancy (or got someone pregnant, unplanned) 0.52*** 0.74 0.73* 3.69**
Had to spend at least $500 to fix a car you had owned for less than half a year 0.62** 0.61* 0.75** 0.96
Been suspended from school for at least 1 day for any reason 0.40*** 0.52** 0.69* 2.63+
Been divorced 0.46*** 0.61* 0.80 4.13**
Had your ID replaced because you lost it 0.58*** 0.78 0.69*** 3.05***
Been kicked out of an apartment or rental property before the lease ran out 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.94 3.99
Quit a job after a week 0.31*** 0.42** 0.86 3.12*
Had the key to your home replaced because you lost it 0.50*** 0.66* 0.71*** 3.01**
Had your electricity, cable, gas or water shut off because you didn’t pay on time 0.38*** 0.55* 0.71** 5.72***
Cheated on your romantic partner of 1 year by having sex with someone else 0.42*** 0.64* 0.84 5.61***
Mean percentage of outcomes −0.26*** −0.15* −0.36*** 0.19**
Effects presented as odds ratios presented from multivariate logistic regressions (for individual outcomes) and standardized linear regression coefficients (for mean percentage); +p <
0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The final six items had no conditioning event.
found that lower SES young adults had lower decision-making
competence for reasons potentially related to their opportuni-
ties to acquire those skills (e.g., stable home environment). Thus,
SES may affect both the decisions that individuals face and their
ability to cope with them.
If age and SES are viewed as factors outside of individuals’ con-
trol, then the correlation between DOI outcomes and A-DMC
after controlling for them might indicate the degree to which
those outcomes are under individuals’ control. In that light, being
evicted, quitting a job after a week, being suspended from school,
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getting five or more speeding tickets, and having a mortgage or
loan foreclosed appear to be the bad outcomes that good decision
making can do the most to avoid. These may also be the indi-
vidual outcomes for which DOI has the clearest interpretation as
reflecting poor decision-making competence.
Age has the strongest independent relationship to DOI, even
after taking into account potential differences in A-DMC and
SES. We found age differences for several outcomes: having a
large credit card debt, having a check bounce, drinking enough
alcohol to vomit, ruining clothes by not following laundry
instructions, and being in a public fight or screaming argument
Each of these outcomes may reflect the higher risks faced by
younger people. Low SES has the strongest independent rela-
tionship to DOI (controlling for A-DMC and age) for outcomes
involving economic problems potentially outside individuals’
control, where decision-making competence cannot overcome
circumstantial constraints: having a check bounce, declaring
bankruptcy, and being behind in rent or mortgage payments.
Those are followed by having a mortgage or loan foreclosed,
being in jail overnight, being diagnosed with an STD, and having
an unplanned pregnancy.
Suggestions for Future Research
The DOI was developed as an outcome assessment that (a) is
convenient for administration in paper-and-pencil or web-based
formats and (b) targets likely results of poor decision-making
processes. The present analyses support its validity in two ways.
One is that most of the individual outcomes are more common
among individuals with lower scores on A-DMC. The second is
that poor outcomes are more common among younger people
and those from lower SES backgrounds, in predictable ways.
Although most outcomes show this pattern, some do not.
One possible way to improve the measure is by reducing it to
those items that performed best. A second is to refine the items
that performed most poorly. For example, the 10-year reporting
period may have taken younger respondents into time periods
for which the outcome was irrelevant (e.g., accumulating $5000
in credit card debt while in high school). A related response is
to create items targeting specific populations (e.g., fraud victim-
ization for the elderly). Similarly, future work could examine
domain-specific item sets (e.g., financial or health), similar to
methods used in developing the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
(DOSPERT) scale (Blais and Weber, 2006). We would like to
see the present analyses repeated with new samples, new items,
and additional covariates having plausible relationships to deci-
sion outcomes. We would also like to see a complementary scale
with good outcomes. Finally, DOI relies on the accuracy (and
candor) of people’s self-reports of negative outcomes7. We were
surprised by howmany poor outcomes participants reported.We
speculate that having so many things that could go wrong made
it easier to admit some as personal failings. Nonetheless, inde-
pendent validation of some outcomes would be valuable, perhaps
using existing panel studies that collect diverse data on health,
finances, and other domains. Despite these limitations, the DOI,
in whole or in part, may provide an efficient way to assess partic-
ipants’ success in decision making, given the constraints of their
age and SES.
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